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Some Personal Recollections 
of Army Operational Research 
on Radar in World War II 
George Lindsey 
O perational Research had its origin at the beginning of the Second World War, and made 
important early contributions to many aspects of the 
Air Defence of Great Britain, an activity of 
monumental significance in the war. Air defence 
depended for its success on the development of a 
command, control, communication and information 
system on a scale that had never been approached 
before. It also depended on other types of technology, 
such as high performance aircraft, air-to-airweapons 
and anti-aircraft artillery, and, most critically, on the 
new science of radar. All of these offered 
opportunities for applications of operational research, 
as did the study of tactics for individual engagements 
and of strategy for the optimum allocation of 
dangerously scarce resources. 
Of the many technological developments that 
made advances throughout the course ofWorld War 
II, radar was the one which saw the greatest 
improvement in capabilities and had the most 
significant influence on operations. The contributions 
of radar to fire control of weapons, and the direction 
and navigation of aircraft and ships, called for 
systematic studies of the technical design and 
performance of the radar, of the weapons depending 
on its information, of the capabilities of the human 
operators, and of the design and effectiveness of the 
entire system of which the radar was one vital part. 
This provided a glorious opportunity for 
operational research. There was an atmosphere of 
extreme urgency. There were no worries about 
budgets. There was no time for extensive 
instrumented field trials or operational 
evaluation-new equipment was rushed into 
service. The data on effectiveness under field 
conditions was obtained from real operations. 
In earlier years it was possible to find people 
who held senior positions in organizations 
conducting important military operations, and 
could therefore give a first hand account of the 
critical decisions and results as seen "top down" 
from the highest level. But if one wants to go back 
as far as World War II, where operational research 
was born, it is getting increasingly difficult to find 
survivors who held senior appointments in the 
early 1940s. I am not one of these. However, I 
was fortunate enough to have been able to 
participate in operational research during World 
War II at a junior level, and to have spent most of 
the half century since then in the study and 
practice of military OR. 
I am going to describe a few incidents which 
occurred in the life of a junior army officer engaged 
in military operational research on the applications 
of radar to air defence, during an extremely active 
period. So what you are going to receive is a bottom-
up worm's eye view of operational research during 
its interesting pioneer period fifty years ago. 
***** 
1\ s Britain mobilized for war, both the Royal 
r-\Navy and the Royal Air Force foresaw the corning 
importance of radar and the need for personnel with 
the technical background that would be necessary 
to operate and maintain the succession of new types 
of equipment that would follow one another as the 
radically new technology progressed. Britain's 
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scientists were quickly directed into a variety of 
wartime activities, with the RAF getting most of 
those whose backgrounds were related to radar. 
A request was made to Canada to provide suitable 
people. Several Canadian universities identified 
students nearing graduation in physics, 
engineering, and mathematics, and organized a 
series of courses. The Navy recruited the first 
batch, and at one time every capital ship in the 
RN had a Canadian radar officer. Later the air 
force and the army had their turn. 
Nobody really knew who would be in charge 
of radar in the Canadian army. The Royal 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps 
(REME) had not been invented. Signallers were 
believed to know something about electricity and 
wireless, but the army wanted to use their radars 
to direct gunfire. My badges were changed from 
University of Toronto Canadian Officers' Training 
Corps to Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, and 
then to Royal Canadian Artillery. 
Mter I graduated from basic courses for coast 
defence and anti-aircraft artillery, and a very good 
course on army radar, I was listed as a Lieutenant 
(EMFC). The term stood for "Electrical Methods of 
Fire Control," a term that was intended to fool 
the enemy, but sometimes resulted in expectations 
that my job was to put out fires in the barracks. 
The word "radar" was secret, although we could 
talk about "radio location." 
The magnetron was so secret that one of my 
early duties was to guard a magnetron with a pistol 
for every minute of its journey from Ottawa to a 
coastal defence battery in Halifax, where an 
experimental fire control radar, based on a new 
centimetric set designed for anti-aircraft use, was 
to be tested. The regular battery officers were 
absolutely confident of the infallible accuracy of 
their optical fire control, which was based on 
combining the bearings observed from two 
telescopes sited at the mouth of the harbour. They 
resented the intrusion of this crazy newfangled 
invention. The fmal test came when the guns frred 
9.2-inch shells at a small towed target, using radar 
information. In the test, the fall of shot (easily 
visible both optically and by radar), straddled the 
target, but the battery declared the radar to be a 
failure since the target had not received a direct 
hit. We asked Halifax Fortress to show us their 
optical plot, so we could compare it with our radar 
plot. This was refused. Later a friendly spy 
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revealed that one of their telescopes was reporting 
true bearings and the other magnetic bearings, 
with the resultant plot making its way over dry 
land. Fortunately no German battleship came to 
provide another test of the coastal defences of 
Canada. 
In 1943 I was posted to the British Army 
Operational Research Group, to work in the section 
responsible for air defence and radar. The activities 
included the operation of recording vans on Heavy 
Anti-Aircraft (HAA) gunsites deployed all over Britain. 
These vans made photographic records of data from 
the radar, predictor, and guns, taken during an 
engagement. The analysts then reconstructed the 
behaviour of these devices, and estimated where the 
target had been and where the shells had burst. 
Errors made during each engagement could be 
assessed. Data pooled from many engagements was 
analyzed to detect trends, including changes in 
enemy tactics. 
The complicated process of the radar fire control 
ofHAA contained errors in many steps. Electrical 
and mechanical calibrations were not perfect. Human 
operators, of whom there were many in the systems 
of those days, could not track the fluctuating radar 
echoes from moving targets or match the moving 
pointers on dials perfectly. The fuse setter added 
delays and made small errors. The predictor's output 
depended on an assumption regarding the motion 
of the target while the shell was in flight. 
Many of the errors introduced by humans were 
reduced by increasing the degree of automation. 
Radar data could be fed directly into the predictor, 
and the motion of the guns and the setting of the 
fuse could be made automatic and slaved to the 
predictor commands. 
A memorable incident occurred during the 
program to make the guns follow automatically. A 
demonstration was organized to display this wonder 
to a high-ranking group of visitors. On a clear day 
they gathered around the guns, observed the radar 
acquire a track, saw the target tow cross well 
within range and watched the guns move steadily 
and remorselessly in response to their automatic 
instructions. They continued to watch in surprise 
as all of the guns suddenly elevated to 90° and 
fired a vertical salvo. When the visitor's ears had 
stopped ringing they discussed this unexpected 
event for a few seconds, until one of them 
remembered that what goes up must come do~. 
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whereupon they abandoned their dignified 
demeanour and demonstrated remarkable 
abilities to sprint in all directions. 
Automation introduced its own problems in 
many ways. For example, radar signals tend to 
fluctuate, so that their indications jitter about the 
correct values, while the predictor needs steady input 
or it will produce wildly changing estimates of future 
position. The input data can be smoothed by ahtunan 
operator, which requires judgement, or it can be fed 
through an electrical filter, set to smooth over a 
selected time period. But what is the best time 
constant? Too short and there is the unwanted jitter. 
Too long and there will be a sluggish response to a 
real change in the course, height, or speed of the 
target. A compromise was attempted with "rate-aided 
laying," which caused the reading to change at a 
constant rate until the operator moved his control, 
at which time an immediate shift in position was 
2nd Lieutenant George Lindsey, 
Royal Canadian Artillery, 1942 
combined with a small change in the rate. But 
what should be the proportion between Delta x 
and Delta x dot? A major step was to make the 
radar follow automatically, but this made it 
vulnerable to ejection of what is now called chaff 
from the target, which could seduce the radar to 
follow the strongest echo in the vicinity, quite likely 
to be a bundle of chaff. 
I vividly remember one visit to a four-gun 3. 7-
inch HAA gunsite near London soon after the 
Luftwaffe had started to use chaff. We picked up an 
approaching bomber and followed it smoothly. I was 
watching the A-scope tracking the range. All of a 
sudden the radar blip started to multiply and leave 
replicas of itself behind. The operator continued to 
track the leading blip, which was reflected from the 
aircraft, whose bundles of chaff were soon left behind 
in the slipstream. Then the guns opened up, with 
a most peculiar tune in four-four time; three great 
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booms followed by a hollow bonk as if someone 
had struck a hollow drainpipe. This got my close 
attention, since I had just been reading a report 
about dangerous wear in barrel liners, causing 
premature explosions at the gunsite. New liners 
were in short supply, so that changes were made 
one gun at a time. Obviously, the number four 
gun in our battery was overdue for a liner change. 
The Vickers and Sperry AA predictors were 
marvels of mechanical ingenuity. They were special 
purpose real-time analogue computers, long before 
digital technology or semiconductor chips had been 
invented. Their variables were processed in the form 
of shaft rotations, their memories were stored on 
three-dimensional cams whose shapes represented 
ballistic data and trigonometric functions, and 
their programs were embedded in the mechanical 
linkages. They were advertised as soldier-proof, a 
foolish boast which proved to be untrue. Their 
successors, the Bedford-Cossor and the Bell 
Telephone Labs BTL, were electrical analogue 
computers, whose data were recorded as voltages, 
memories were in potentiometers, and programs in 
hard-wired circuitry. 
All predictors had to be provided with an 
assumption (which would now be called an algorithm) 
regarding the future motion of the moving target. The 
simplest hypothesis was that the target would 
maintain the same course, speed, and height that it 
had at the moment that the fuse was set. But the 
pilot could falsify that assumption by taking evasive 
action, although this might spoil an accurate bomb 
run. Prediction along the tangent to the track would 
cope with a steady descent on a constant beartng, 
but would produce a future position that would 
oscillate wildly ahead of a snaked track, and would 
never be correct against a helical track. It could 
predict along a chord, but what chord? Today such 
problems would be classified as artificial intelligence. 
A solution to this problem of evasive action 
was offered by the Crabtree predictor, which 
allowed a human operator to place his personal 
estimate of the future position on a plot, and then 
direct the guns to hit that spot. An experimental 
mockup was built, and an RAF pilot, who it was 
hoped might have psychic powers regarding the 
habits of his Luftwaffe counterparts, practised his 
skills against British bomber pilots, and predicted 
their manoeuvres with remarkable success. The 
equipment was installed on a gunsight in London, 
with the latest twin 5.25-inch navalAAguns, and 
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the next real air raid eagerly awaited. Alas, the 
Luftwaffe did not oblige for a long time. Finally 
the sirens went, a detection was made on the 
radar, and a hostile target approached the gunsite. 
The psychic pilot commenced his duties, 
concentrating with extraordinary skill, oblivious 
to the excitement of the rest of the team, and 
successfully forecast every manoeuvre of the 
German bomber. Finally the bomber disappeared 
from the display, the pilot looked up, exhausted 
but elated and inquired "How did I do?" The 
answer was "You never gave us the order to fire!" 
The cumulative results of experience, and 
technical improvements, aided by operational 
research, increased the effectiveness of AA 
Command against German bomber aircraft between 
1941 and 1944 by a factor estimated to be between 
four and five. 
The Air Defence of Great Britain encountered a 
new challenge in 1944, just after the launching of 
the D-Day cross-channel invasion of France. The V1 
unmanned pulse-jet flying bomb, in today's 
terminology a Ground-Launched Cruise Missile, 
provided a target for air defence that was easier in 
one respect, in that it took no evasive action, but more 
difficult in several others, in that it was smaller 
and faster than the bombers of the day, flew at an 
altitude that was too low for easy engagement by 
HAA but too high for Light Anti-Aircraft (LAA), 
and was likely to inflict serious damage even if 
brought down by AA fire unless its warhead was 
detonated in the air. 
The new threat caused AA Command to make 
major redeployments of the forces which had been 
stationed in static sites for the defence of British cities. 
Only cities in the south of England were within range 
of the V1launch sites in France, and of these by far 
the most important target was London. Once a V1 
reached London it was not useful to shoot it down 
and have its bomb detonate in the city; it was better 
to leave it alone in the hope that it would keep on 
going and land in the open country to the north of the 
city. 
The first strategy was to move the guns from 
all over Britain to the North Downs, between 
London and the Channel, with fighter aircraft 
operating to the south and barrage balloons to 
the north of the gun belt. An immediate difficulty 
arose due to the rolling hills in the area and the 
low altitude of the approaching V1s, which did 
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not enter the lowest radar beams and clear the 
ground clutter until they had penetrated to very 
close range. An improvement was obtained by 
installing a large horizontal wire screen around 
the radar site, a practice that had been adopted 
earlier for fixed sites around cities, and adding a 
low vertical wire fence at the perimeter of the 
screen. The resulting diffraction pattern of the 
radar energy allowed a concentrated lower beam 
to escape the ground clutter but achieve early 
detection of the small approaching target. 
Nevertheless, the results were disappointing, and 
other difficulties of an operational nature were 
encountered in demarcation of the boundaries of 
operating zones for guns and for fighters. Overall, 
the fighters obtained better results than the guns. 
I remember receiving a decidedly chilly 
welcome in a town in Sussex, whose inhabitants 
disapproved of the attempts of the gunners to 
bring the V1s down into their town, instead of 
letting them proceed on to London. I also 
remember watching a V1 land in London about a 
mile away from where I was standing, saw a dark 
spherical shock wave expanding into the sky from 
the point of impact, then felt the shock wave 
coming through the ground, with my feet, and 
later heard and felt the blast propagated through 
the air. 
As well as attempting to make HAA operate 
at altitudes below those for which it was most 
effective, efforts were made to improve the 
capabilities ofLAA at altitudes higher than those 
for which it had been designed. The 40 mm shells 
for the Bofors guns were contact-fused, so that 
there was no time fuse to set, but to damage the 
target a direct hit was necessary. Ranges and times 
of flight were short, and optical tracking in bearing 
and angle of sight was quite accurate. The 
Kerrison LAA predictor would work reasonably 
well if fed with accurate range data, but the 
various optical methods of estimating range were 
crude and notoriously inaccurate. As a solution 
it was suggested that a simple radar range-only 
set designed for the tail gun turret of Lancaster 
bombers, whose gunners could also track 
direction optically but required accurate range 
data, should be mounted on the Kerrison 
predictor. I participated in the work at 
Telecommunications Research Establishment 
(TRE), which had designed the aircraft radar, and 
were preparing to modify the equipment for the 
AA predictors in their own model shop. I then 
went to LAA sites to observe their operations. I 
remember one night watching a V1 make a low 
approach directly over our gunsite, and being 
engaged with very visible tracer-equipped shells. 
I also remember eagerly anticipating a hit, and 
then suddenly wondering what would happen 
after we hit the target. I never found out. 
The unsatisfactory deployment of the AA gun 
zone south of London was radically corrected, by 
moving all calibers down to a narrow belt right at the 
channel coast, from where they could have an 
unobstructed line of sight over the water with no 
obstacles, and on a clear night even see the V1s 
almost as soon as they were launched from France. 
V1s damaged by AA fire usually fell into the sea. 
Two other factors were also changed for the better. 
American SCR-584 radars with fully automatic 
tracking and data transmission were deployed in large 
numbers, and the guns were armed with the new 
and very secret proximity fuses. It was an AA 
gunners' paradise. (Lesser branches of the army, and 
all branches of the air force, maintain that anti-aircraft: 
gunners never go to Paradise, but I now know that 
this is not true.) I remember looking along the 
channel coast on a clear night and seeing seven 
V1s in flight at the same time, greeted by a 
spectacular display offrreworks, including 20 mm 
shells landing in the water at about 1 I 3 of the 
range to their target, 40 mm tracer passing very 
close to their targets, 90 mm and 3. 7-inch 
proximity-fused shells detonating about 50 feet 
above the water well beyond their targets, other 
HAA shells bursting very close to the targets, and 
occasionally a wonderful giant explosion when a 
V1 warhead was detonated. Mter that Guy Fawkes 
and the 24th of May have never seemed very 
impressive. 
In addition to its investigations of air defence, 
Army Operational Research Section 1 (AORS 1) 
made some studies of the use of radar in support of 
field artillery. It was suggested that mortar bombs, 
which were causing severe casualties to infantry in 
the Far East, might be tracked in their slow high 
parabolic trajectories, and the launcher located for 
counter frre. But the mortar bombs were very small 
and the polar diagram of the radar reflections 
would depend on the precise shape and angle of 
observation. We needed to measure the reflections 
from a real Japanese mortar bomb. One which 
had been captured in Burma was available in an 
ordnance establishment near London, and I was 
provided with a jeep and told to go and get it. It 
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had a rather sinister appearance, with Japanese 
stencils on it, and the explosives expert who was 
about to give it to me seemed to treat it with 
considerable caution. I explained that we were 
only interested in its outer casing, nose, and fms, 
and had no interest in its interior. He asked me if 
I planned to remove the fuse, detonator, and high 
explosive. This was not the way I had planned 
my day, and I explained that our laboratory was 
lacking some of the necessary equipment and 
asked him if he could possibly save us some time 
and do this for me. This he did, with me as a very 
attentive and alert bystander. I noticed that he 
held the fuse between his thumb and little finger, 
which seemed an odd grip for something not to 
be dropped. He explained that if it went off he 
might save one or two fingers that way. I was 
content to bring the bomb back to Ibstock Place 
without its innards. 
When the Canadian Anny decided to establish 
its own Army Operational Research Group and 
prepare to move its operations to the Pacific Theatre, 
I was posted back to Canada. 
This account has focused on the type of 
operational research that is closely associated with 
the technical performance of equipment forming 
an element of a complicated system. At the time, 
many functions which had been performed by 
humans, with inevitable inaccuracy, were being 
converted to automatic operation, which removed 
errors, but sometimes introduced new problems 
involving the need for human judgment. 
The type of problems with command, control, 
communication, and information systems being 
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discussed fifty years later have some of the same 
elements. Operational Research will be needed, and 
the practitioners may have to become very 
knowledgeable regarding the technical performance 
of the various types of equipment involved in the 
systems. Exercises must approximate the 
operational situation as closely as is possible in 
peacetime. But the studies may not be as exciting 
as they were in AORG in 1944. 
This paper was first presented at the Eleventh 
International Symposium on Military Operational 
Research, Royal Military College of Science, 
Shrivenham, England in September 1994. 
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